Is urban economic performance driven by a few factors? We study a simple model for the probability that an individual in a city is employed in a given urban activity. The theory posits that three quantities drive this probability: the activity-specific complexity, individual-specific knowhow, and the city-specific collective knowhow. We use data on employment across industries and metropolitan statistical areas in the US, from 1990 to 2016, to show that these drivers can be measured and have measurable consequences over measures of urban economic performance. First, we analyze the functional form of the probability function proposed by the theory, and show its superiority when compared to competing alternatives. Second, we show that individual and collective knowhow correlate with measures of urban economic performance, suggesting the theory can provide testable implications for why some cities are more prosperous than others.
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Introduction
Can a few fundamental characteristics specific to each city and economic activity explain the patterns of urban economic development? Can those fundamental characteristics be measured? In this paper we will address these questions from the framework provided by the theory of economic complexity [1, 2] applied to cities [3] . This approach assumes that the fundamental quantity that determines the functioning of a social system is the amount of coordinated knowhow present in a city that is distributed across individuals, and how this enables the appearance of different economic activities which require different amounts of knowhow. Figure 1 shows the matrix of employment levels in the year 2016 across 381 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and across 91 industries (3-digit NAICS codes). From its seemingly chaotic appearance emerges a peculiar simplicity: cities with high levels of total employment (left-most columns) employ more workers across more industries, and industries with high levels of total employment (upper-most rows) employ more workers across more cities. Thus, the highest levels of employment are in the upper-left corner of the matrix (dark-red colors) with rapidly decreasing levels as one moves towards the bottom-right corner (light-blues). Despite this simplicity, models and explanations that have been proposed in the literature to explain such patterns are unnecessarily complicated. Here we present a theory that offers a clear explanation and generates novel testable implications. Work in geography and economics typically emphasizes the role of "economic forces". These are forces which drive the distribution of employment away from two possible extremes: one in which each city specializes in a few industries, or one in which employment is distributed uniformly across industries and cities. The former are agglomeration forces that would generate a block-diagonal pattern in Fig. 1 , while the latter are dispersion forces that would generate a uniformly colored matrix. In such framework, the labor force is "redistributed" in space such that agglomeration forces equilibrate dispersion forces (see [4] for a review of the literature). The patterns we observe in the distribution of employment across industries and cities in Fig. 1 , however, display "nestedness" [5] , that is, industries present in the least diversified cities are among the industries present in the most diversified cities. The patterns in Fig. 1 are, therefore, outside the range of distributions that are in between complete specialization and complete uniformity shares.
The triangularity pattern implied by nestedness is observed in the fact that larger cities will have on average more employment in any particular industry. However, the increase in employment with city size follows a particular pattern. It has been found that the employment Y c,f in city c in an industry f increases non-linearly with size such that Y c,f ∝ N β c . This statistical regularity is also observed in other urban phenomena such as cases of crime, infectious disease prevalence, educational attainment, and technological innovation [3, [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . The nestedness and the power-law relationship across such diverse set of phenomena are both key empirical observations that should disabuse us from the idea that a necessary condition to explain Fig. 1 are the presence of "economic forces". Explanations that solely invoke markets and equilibria will miss the essential underlying mechanisms and will not help us fully understand these patterns. A more general mechanism must be at work.
We propose the "production recipes" general approach to understand urban phenomena [14] . This approach suggests that questions like why does a given industry employ more workers per capita in some cities than in others? or why in a given city do some industries employ more workers than others? have to be framed as questions about the shape of the function in cities that generates output across different types of phenomena. In other words, it is about the mathematical shape of the urban production function. Production processes, we want to emphasize, go beyond economic processes, because what occurs in a city is not sharply divided into economics and non-economics. Cities are complex systems composed of highly interconnected parts, and from the collective actions of citizens seeking jobs, sentimental partners, learning, negotiating conflicts, etc., one observes a set of aggregate output across different phenomena. In order to understand which urban phenomenon will occur in which cities one needs to look beyond economic forces and seek probabilistic models that provide null statistical laws, similar to those proposed to explain Zipf's law [15, 16] .
Our null statistical model is founded upon the theory of economic complexity, which assumes that production is the process of combining a multiplicity of complementary inputs (for similar approaches, see [17] [18] [19] ). Our contribution is to demonstrate that a simple theory, which has already been shown to explain a wide set of observations about international trade [2] and the prevalence of urban phenomena in cross-sections of cities [3] , explains the distribution of employment and tells us that it is driven by three fundamental quantities: the inherent complexity of each industry, the skills of citizens, and the collective knowhow of the city. Once we estimate these quantities, the theory can provide testable implications for why some cities are more prosperous than others.
Model of urban economic complexity
The theory behind our model is based on three assumptions. First, most of urban phenomena are the conjunction of complementary factors. Complementarity implies that for a phenomenon to occur, all factors must be simultaneously present. More complex phenomena are those that require more of the underlying causal factors. Second, cities acquire these factors through a stochastic process of accumulation. And third, each person in the city is different in the factors they bring to the city. The exposure of people to the city is what generates the different outcomes across urban phenomena. These assumptions are the general basis for the theory of economic complexity [1, 2, 20] . They can be mathematized and developed into a quantitative model of cities [3] .
In this theory, a phenomenon occurs when the requirements (or factors) for the phenomenon are all satisfied, either because the individual has them or because they are provisioned by the city. Assume that a specific industry f requires the combination of M f different and complementary capabilities. The parameter M f represents, in this view, the "inherent complexity" of the economic activity associated with the production of industry's product f . The more capabilities are needed, the larger the value of M f , and the more complex the activity. We note that the number of capabilities, in principle, can be very large, i.e., M f 1. Thinking probabilistically in this model will provide several insights, and this is enabled by the assumption about the large multiplicity of capabilities [3] .
Let s i represent a measure of how many of the capabilities individual i already has. Specifically, let it be the probability that she has any capability of the M f capabilities required by the typical business in industry f . This probability can be interpreted as a measure of her individual knowhow. Although s i can be interpreted as the level of schooling or education, it is meant to capture not the depth of knowledge but the breadth: It is about how many different things she could know how to do by herself.
Finally, we need to consider that, through her exposure to other people, services and institutions within the urban milieu, the city "provides" certain capabilities that she does not possess. Presumably, the bigger the city, the more diverse, and the more capabilities it can offer. Let us denote r c as the probability that the city c provides any of the capabilities. We can imagine that the city has a "field" spread in the xy-coordinates, r c (x, y). This field is an abstraction of the urban milieu that represents the probability that the city provides one of the ingredients for phenomena to occur, and we can assume that people interact with it as they live and work in the city. It should capture the elements from all the types of urban interactions to which people are exposed through the social, economic and built environment. In this view, the city functions as though it is permeated across space by a "cultural field", and r c (x, y) quantifies the magnitude of the social, economic, and cultural repertoire available at a particular location. When the value of the field is high, it means that this location in the city has a high concentration of "diverse urban factors".
This framework allows us to see clearly that urban phenomena occur because individuals are able to "execute" a recipe (e.g., a production process, a program or algorithm) if the environment is favorable; that is, if the city complements the individual. How complex a given recipe is, how capable is an individual, and how suitable is the city for executing the recipe are the three fundamental quantities that determine the overall statistics of employment in cities, as well as other measures of urban output.
The probability that individual i will be employed in industry f given that she lives in city c can be written as
See Appendix A for details of the derivation. The exponent is the product of three quantities, respectively associated with the phenomenon, the person, and the city. These are the drivers of employment in the city, which is why we refer to them as the drivers of urban economic complexity. We want to emphasize that the value of such equation is that, through it, the model establishes null expectations regarding the broad patterns manifested across urban phenomena. Such approach is typical in "mean field theories" in physics. Models of cultural evolution predict there exists an association between demography and the size of culture, r c = a + b ln(N c ) [21, 22] . Applied to an urban context, it implies the diversity of factors and capabilities in city c that on average a worker encounters is approximately a logarithmic function of the population size. Incorporating this prediction into the theory of urban economic complexity (i.e., Equation (1)) one can explain several empirical observations. It explains why the relationship between measures of urban output (like employment in certain industries) are associated with total population size through a power-law function [3, 23] . It also explains why and how different phenomena of the same kind (e.g., two sexually transmitted diseases, two types of college degrees, or two types of crimes), which presumably are driven by similar networks of interaction, can feature very different scaling patterns (see [11, 12, 24] ). Of particular importance, more complex phenomena scale more superlinearly, explaining why more complex technological innovations and production processes tend to occur in larger and more diverse urban hubs [3, 23, 25, 26] . For the present analysis, however, we relax the assumption about r c and its association with the logarithm of population size, and we let the data speak.
The aim of the present paper is to estimate directly the quantities introduced by the theory in Eq. (1) and quantify how they signify important statistical improvements over alternative conceptualizations of cities from a modeling point of view. In brief, we show that the drivers of "urban economic complexity" can be measured and have measurable consequences.
The three drivers of urban economic complexity
Two aspects stand out in Eq. (1). First, the exponent in Eq. (1) is the negative of a logprobability and, as a consequence, it has units of entropy (i.e, "nats" or "bits"). Given that entropy quantifies the information required to describe a stochastic system, it is reasonable to refer to this (negative) exponent as a "net complexity" (see [27] for a nuanced review about the relationship between Shannon entropy and Kolmogorov Complexity). For us, net complexity captures the complementarity between the person, the city and the activity. With this terminology, we say that employment rates are determined by this complementarity. We claim, however, that net complexity has consequences beyond just terminology.
The second observation about Eq. (1) is that net complexity is decomposable into three factors: the drivers of urban complexity. Let us dive into the meaning of the terms in Eq. (1):
This is the number of capabilities required to produce the industry-specific product f . We can refer to it as the intrinsic "complexity" of the industry.
2. 1 − s i : This is the person-specific probability of lacking any one capability. Accordingly, s i can be referred to as a measure of "individual knowhow".
3. 1 − r c : This is the city-specific probability of lacking any one capability. Accordingly, r c can be referred to as a measure of "collective knowhow" and represents a measure of input availability, which in turn represents a measure of urban diversity.
Changes in these terms change the probability of employment. This is because some industries involve production processes that are inherently more difficult to execute than others, some cities foster industrial activities less than others, and some individuals are less capable of contributing to industrial processes than others. 1 Our model explicitly shows how these three drivers of net complexity, once given, interact and determine the statistical properties of employment.
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Interestingly, these changes have exponential effects. That is to say, small changes in any of these three terms can in principle have very large effects on the employability of a person. In fact, the effect on the probability of employment of a technology improvement (when M f is reduced by 1) is smaller than the effect of individual learning (when s i is increased by 1/M f ) which is smaller than the effect of collective learning (when r c is increased by 1/M f ) (see Appendix B). Increasing the collective knowhow of city c can occur through immigration that brings capabilities and knowhow in people not available already in c 3 , direct foreign investments that inject specific capabilities to specific industries, or by pure innovation. Presently, we lack a detailed theory about the dynamical laws of these drivers and how they relate to one another. Still, these observations allow us to remark that increases in collective knowhow may have a reinforcing effect which initiates a virtuous cycle: a place with a relative large body of collective knowhow will attract more people and facilitate more complex economic activities, which themselves will increase the body of collective knowhow in that place. This process will thus propel a run-away cycle of collective learning that will concentrate economic activities and wealth in large cities (see, e.g., [29] ). The more complex the activities, the more concentrated they will be in very few places. Once again, this explains why complex activities (e.g., being an inventor) tend to happen and concentrate disproportionately more in large cities as compared to less complex activities [3] .
The fact that net complexity is decomposable leads to a strategy for estimating its components. In the Results section we will demonstrate that the drivers of urban economic complexity proposed by this model can be readily estimated, up to a multiplicative factor. Moreover, this model outperforms previous scaling models in terms of its out-of-sample predictive value. Crucially, the resulting estimates of the city-specific driver of urban complexity will be shown to be associated with measures of economic performance.
Materials and methods
Data was downloaded using the programming codes that have made available by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We use data on the estimated counts of employment, number of establishments and average wages by city-industry-year. See Appendix C for additional details of the data.
Measuring the drivers of urban complexity
Let us assume we have an estimate of the probability in Eq. (1), p i,c,f . Equating such estimate to the proposed functional form, and taking negative logarithms twice, yields
where ε i,c,f is the error one would try to minimize in the estimation of the parameters on the right-hand side. Equation (2) shows how net complexity is decomposed linearly into its main components. With an estimate of the probability on the left-hand side, p i,c,f , we can regress it against three additive fixed-level effects from the phenomena, the individual, and the city.
As it is often the case, we do not have information at the individual level. For this reason, we currently are unable to estimate the probability in the left-hand side of Eq. (2). To address this limitation, in Appendix D we show that, assuming the distribution of s i in city c has some basic properties, we can substitute s i by the average individual knowhow in city c, s c ≈ i∈c s i /N c . This substitution allows us to estimate instead the probability Pr{X c,f = 1} that any (random) individual in city c is employed in activity f . We estimate it through a per capita rate, y c,f = Y c,f /N c , where Y c,f is the employment count in industry f in city c and N c is total population size. Equation (2) becomes
where
. We note that the city fixed effect is a city-specific variable that includes the interaction between the suitability of the urban environment and the average capacities of citizens. In order to separate γ c into the individual-level and city-level components, we will assume that s i is partly determined by the person's educational attainment. More years of educational attainment are usually a measure of specialization, but they are also an indication of a person's competency to perform several productive tasks. Thus, we will proxys c using the average levels of schooling in the city c (see Appendix for details).
Figures 9, 10, and 11 in Appendix I show the evolution of the rankings of cities and industries through the years according to the average years of schooling, the inherent complexity of industries, and the estimated collective knowhow.
Evaluation against competing models
Does model (3) represent an improvement over potentially simpler alternatives that also predict employment rates across cities and industries? In the words of Herbert Simon, "[i]n testing theories aimed at explaining empirical phenomena, it is not enough to satisfy ourselves that the observed data are consistent with the theory. We must also ask whether the data can be explained equally well by other, perhaps weaker and simpler, theories" [30] . If our model is indeed comparatively better, then we will have evidence that the theory is capturing meaningful aspects of reality that other models are not [31] .
Specifically, we evaluate the predictive power of model (3) with respect to four alternative models using holdout data. Two of the models differ from our model only in terms of the functional transformation of the dependent variable; that is, rather than − ln(− ln(y c,f,t )), the left-hand side is given by y c,f,t (namely Model 1.1) and ln(y c,f,t ) (Model 1.2), respectively. Importantly, differences in predictive performance between model (3) and these two other models will inform us about the importance of the specific functional form predicted by the theory.
The other two alternative models differ from (3) in the formulation of the right-hand side of the model. One model (namely Model 2.1) will be the standard urban scaling model where it is assumed that the scaling exponent is the same for all phenomena, as suggested by network-based explanations [32] . The last alternative model (Model 2.2) is an unconstrained version of the standard scaling model, where it is assumed that both the baseline prevalence and the scaling exponent differ, in principle, for each industry f (see Appendix E). Differences in performance between model (3) and these last two models will inform us about the validity of adding degrees of freedom to explain employment patterns across cities and industries.
To compare these models based on "out-of-sample" prediction performance, for each year, we split the data into training and testing (or validation) sets. After the parameters of the models are fitted using the training data, they are then compared by how accurately they predict the dependent variable on the test set. The predictions were evaluated using the root mean squared error (RMSE ) and the mean absolute error (MAE ). The train and test random splits were repeated 100 different times of the data (bootstrapping cross-validation). See Appendix E for more details.
Linking the drivers with urban economic performance
How should one evaluate whether there is a link between what we have called the drivers of urban economic complexity and economic performance? Our aim here is to understand how the drivers that affect the distribution of employment across cities and industries might be associated with the economic performance of firms and workers in a cross section of cities and industries. In particular, we are interested in analyzing whether our variables of interest (individual knowhow, industry complexity, and collective knowhow) are positively associated with larger firms on the one hand, and higher levels of productivity (e.g., higher wages, classically thought as reflecting the marginal productivity of labor) on the other. We will analyze these associations through the following linear regression:
where we have made explicit the time dimension t representing years. We will carry out different specifications of regression model (4) for different combinations of the explanatory variables, one for each year separately to control for changes in nominal prices. We will use as independent variables our estimates ln( s c,t ), the negative of δ f,t , and γ c,t , respectively. The coefficients β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 are elasticities, in the language of economics, and are therefore unit-less. Such coefficients will represent the percent change in the dependent variable associated with one percent change in the corresponding explanatory variable. These will be estimated using the full data. The dependent variable z c,f,t will represent, first, average establishment size, and second, average wages. Here, we face two challenges. First, the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides data about establishments, not firms, at the level of city-industry combinations. Hence, a large firm may be composed of many small establishments, and these will necessarily affect the validity of Eq. (4). Second, theories of firm sizes and wages should explain not average values but the shape of the distributions and their parameters, given that the most distinctive characteristic of these quantities is the broadness and skewness of their statistical distributions [33] . As a corollary, the broadness of these distributions poses an empirical limitation for studying the sample averages, since these may not even exist.
Notwithstanding these caveats, we expect the following general items to hold: (i) High levels ofs c indicate workers with high levels of skill in city c, which should in turn correlate positively with high wages in the city [34] [35, 36] . According to our model, however, high s c means that people depend less on external knowhow, and therefore we expect it to be negatively associated with firm size. (ii) A high level of r c indicates a city with high level of collective knowhow and thus a place with a large diversity of different skills where opportunities for complementarity abound. These opportunities should thus affect positively the size of firms and the productivity of workers [37] . (iii) Sophisticated industries with high levels of M f should also induce a premium on productivity since their products are rare and difficult to produce (they will only be produced in large cities) which should allow firms to have few competitors and raise prices. Because high values of M f imply the combination of many complementary inputs, firms should be larger, and gains multiplicative.
Explaining what determines the size of firms, or the wages of workers, are each complicated issues, and the literature on these topics is extensive (e.g., [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] ). Furthermore, the body of work investigating the differences in productivity across metropolitan areas in the U.S. has found a long list of relevant factors [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] . We note, however, that the main stylized fact is that firms and workers in larger (more populous) cities are more productive. Given this, we included in our regressions the logarithm of city population size as a control variable.
We will include in our analysis two measures of collective knowhow and complexity proposed before in the literature. These measures are known as the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) and the Product Complexity Index (PCI) [1] . These indices are based on a spectral clustering method [58] [59] [60] . As such, the method provides one vector of ratings for cities and another for industries, and these ratings cluster cities and industries according to their pairwise similarities deduced from the presence/absence matrix of industries across cities (i.e., a discrete version of Figure 1 ). These indices, it is worth pointing out, are not estimates of knowhow or complexity in a statistical sense. Instead, they are a construction which, given their empirical high correlation with measures of economic growth, are assumed to cluster cities and industries by their underlying number of capabilities (see [61] for a discussion). We will show, however, that our results suggest the ECI and PCI cluster cities and industries not by the number of capabilities, but by the type. Figure 2 presents the results of comparing model (3) against four alternative models. To make the comparison clearer, we divide the MAE (and RMSE, respectively) of each alternative model by the MAE * (RMSE * ) of our model in each run of the bootstrapping cross-validations. Models with worse predictive performance than ours will be above the dashed line, while models with better performance will lie below the line.
Results

Comparing prediction power of models
Results show that our model, given by (3), has superior performance in terms of M AE with respect to all alternative models except for the unconstrained scaling model (Model 2.2, where baseline prevalence and the scaling exponent can differ for each industry f ). The comparable performance of Model 2.2 in M AE, in which intercept and scaling exponents are allowed to vary across industries, is supportive of the ideas and results we have reported elsewhere [3] . Our model has also superior performance in terms of RM SE with respect to all models except for the first alternative model (Model 1.1, where the dependent variable is not logged). Interestingly, this indicates that city and industry fixed effects directly fitted on per capita employment provide an alternative good fit to the data, but only when there are no extreme values (RM SE is more sensitive to outliers).
This section validates the use of our regression specification as a way of estimating the levels of collective knowhow in cities and the complexity of industries. In the subsequent sections we will use the full sample to estimate these quantities.
Relation to population size, industrial diversity, occupational diversity, and geographical ubiquity
Having estimated γ c,t and δ c,t , we first present a descriptive understanding of how much these estimates conform to our proposed notions of collective knowhow and industry complexity. Figure 3A shows that most large cities have scores of collective knowhow that are above the average. Among these large cities, Boston has the largest score. One exception is the metropolitan area of Washington DC, which falls below the average. Interestingly, New York City is closer to cities like Detroit, Austin and Phoenix, than to cities like Chicago, Los Angeles or Boston. Figure 3B and C show how the scores correlate with population size and industrial diversity, respectively. Here, we define industrial diversity by the number of industries in each city that have location quotients larger than one. That is, if
Evidently, our estimate of collective knowhow follows both population size and industrial diversity, as expected. The association with diversity, however, has been increasing with time, which may suggest the fact that the process of diversification is driven by larger bodies of collective knowhow.
We then assess whether our measure of the complexity of industries is consistent with our notion of "difficulty". We define "occupational effective diversity" as the exponential of Shannon's entropy, based on the share of employment across occupations per industry. That is, if [62, 63] for a review of effective diversity measures, and see Appendix C for the source of occupation-industry data). The measure of geographical ubiquity is analogous to above's measure of industrial diversity for cities. That is, u f = c 1 {LQc,f>1} (e.g., see [1] ). Figure 4A shows that many financial and manufacturing-related industries have scores that are above the average. Interestingly, "Performing arts and spectator sports" appears in ranking 17, above industries like "Computer and electronics" or "Plastics and rubber products" manufacturing. The least complex industries, not unsurprisingly, are some common service industries, with "Food services and drinking places" at the bottom of all. Figure 4B and C show how the scores correlate with the measure of occupational diversity of industries, and with the measure of geographical ubiquity, respectively. Somewhat unexpectedly, the measure of complexity does not correlate with the effective number of occupations that are typically employed by the industry. This result may imply an aspect in which our model breaks by not taking into account the other economic forces at play, but it may also suggest that occupations are not the fundamental unit of knowhow. Conversely, the fact that the most complex industries occur in the fewest metropolitan areas indicates that these industries are indeed dependent on the right urban context to occur.
Relationship between the drivers and the establishment sizes and wages
As a preamble to explaining establishment sizes and wages for each city-industry combination, we assessed the correlation between our measures at the level of whole cities, and whole industries. From Figures 5A and B, we can see that the association between wages and establishment size on the one hand, and collective knowhow on the other, is very strong. The association is stable across years, as shown in the insets of the graphs. The association of these variables at the aggregate level of industries (panels C and D), however, is less strong.
Next, we investigated the associations at the level of city-industry combinations, as in Eq. (4). Tables 1 and 2 present the results of seven regression models applied to the year 2016, where the dependent variables are establishment sizes and wages, respectively.
In Table 1 , the coefficient for population size is fairly constant across specifications, indicating that in the cross-section of U.S. metropolitan areas, a 1% increase in population size is, on average, associated with 0.13 − 0.15% increases in average establishment size. Average years of schooling is positively associated with establishment size, but when we control for the rest of variables, it switches sign and becomes negatively associated, indicating that a 1% increase in the average years of schooling of individuals in a city is associated with a 0.6 − 0.9% reduction of establishment size. Such result, although somewhat unintuitive, is consistent with our theory. The association between firm size and the inherent complexity of industries, however, is unexpected. We find that a 1% increase in the number of "ingredients" of an industry is associated with approximately a 0.8% reduction in the size of establishments. Note that this negative relationship also holds for the Product Complexity Index. At face value, these results may be indications of an inconsistency in our model. This is reminiscent of Figure 4B that showed a lack of correlation between the complexity of industries and the effective number of occupations employed by them. In spite of this, there may be unaccounted sources of error, or omitted variables, which we ought to have included. For example, according to the theory, what we should be measuring is not the number of employees per establishment, but the number of productive capabilities used by firms. Together with Figure 4B , these results imply that it is worth studying what is the productive unit over which firms are created and function. Therefore, investigating the relationship between industry complexity, number of establishments per firm, and the unit of production will be part of future work. Finally, the relationship with collective knowhow is as expected: establishments located in cities with high levels of collective knowhow are larger in size. This positive relationship is maintained even after including the Economic Complexity Index.
In Table 2 we observe very similar patterns with regards to wages. The coefficient for population size is again relatively stable across specifications, with a 1% increase in population size associated with a 0.07 − 0.10% increase in average wages in the city-industry cell. Average years of schooling is positively associated with wages, with a 1% increase leading to a 0.2−0.8% increase in wages. Also consistent with our expectations is the finding that a 1% change in the inherent complexity of an industry is associated with approximately a 0.3% positive change in wages. Notice, however, that this positive association looses some statistical significance (p < 0.05) if we control for the PCI and ECI. Finally, there is a positive relationship between Table 2 . Associations with average wages. Linear regressions for (log) average wages at the city-industry level as a function of city (log) population size, (log) of average years of schooling, (log) of the inherent industry complexity, (log) of the collective knowhow of city, controlling for economic and product complexity indices. Regression average wages and collective knowhow, maintained even after including the ECI. However, this relationship also looses some statistical significance after we control for city population size.
The results shown in Tables 1 and 2 are unchanged across the years, as can be observed in Appendix K ( Figure 13) where we plot the coefficients of one multivariate regression per year that only includes (log) of population size, (log) of years of schooling, (log) of industry complexity, and (log) of collective knowhow. By excluding the variable for years of schooling which is only available since 2009, we plot in Figure 14 in Appendix K the same type of time series, but since 1990. Interestingly, the time evolution of these coefficients reveal that wages and industry complexity have become more tightly associated over the years.
Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, we proposed a probabilistic theory to explain the statistical regularities behind the economic development of cities and their industrial structure. The theory was based on two key ideas: industries are defined as the result of combining several complementary factors (like ingredients in a recipe) carried by people, and cities accumulate these factors. The interaction between the factors that individuals carry with them, the factors that they find in their urban environment, and the activities they engage with, determines their probability of being employed across industries. The question was whether the existence of city-specific and industry-specific fundamental quantities derived from the model would explain the statistical patterns of employment, average wages, and size of establishments. We tested the theory by analyzing the functional form of the mathematical model, and its scope for explaining phenomena in comparison with competing explanations and other metrics proposed in the literature.
We started by observing the triangular pattern revealed in the matrix of employment in Figure 1 . Our model posits that the triangular pattern emerges as a result of the interplay between three latent quantities: the levels of individual knowhow in a city, the inherent complexity of the industries, and the levels of collective knowhow across cities. More specifically, the theory indicates that these quantities interact multiplicatively in the exponent of an exponential function, and we presented supporting evidence that this functional form is statistically superior to alternative models.
In general, previous theories for the prevalence of phenomena in cities (e.g., levels of employment in industries, number of homicides in a city in a year, cases of infectious diseases) [32, [64] [65] [66] were anchored only in the suitability of the system (e.g., r c in our model) to foster the occurrence of a given phenomenon. The suitability was assumed to be a reflection of the nature of the networks and geometric substrate of interactions. These previous approaches thus neglected the characteristics of each phenomenon and of individuals. The broad argument stated that since interactions in a network scale faster than linearly with the number of agents, urban indicators that are the result of social interactions should also scale superlinearly with population size. Since these social networks are embedded in physical environments, the increase of interactions is mechanically driven by increases in the population density. The premise here is that any urban output is a function of the number of times people bump into each other.
Previous explanations are thus partly correct, but have some limitations if one wants to explain the statistical differences across distinct urban phenomena, such as those revealed in Fig. 1 . One of the main limitations of such network-based and density-based models is that they predict, for example, a unique way in which all phenomena will scale-i.e., the scaling exponent that characterizes how the prevalence of phenomena grows with population size is the same for all interaction-based activities, unless one postulates a different network of interactions for each phenomenon. Moreover, we show in Appendix F that the canonical urban scaling model predicts that all measures of output per capita scale with the square root of city population density, regardless of any consideration about spatial equilibrium or budget constraints. Previous explanations offer a powerful framework because they show how constrained urban output can be. But by the some token, it is difficult to identify free levers in them that can accommodate the diversity of scaling patterns.
We posit that network-based models are useful for thinking about the associations between infrastructure, population, density and output, but not for thinking about disaggregated measures of output. Consider, for example, the network of sexual encounters and that of business relationships. Cases of sexually transmitted diseases and counts of employment are both the output of urban processes. Presumably, the two networks underlying these two phenomena are different. Therefore, according to a network-based explanation, one should expect that the scaling of cases of sexually transmitted diseases to be different than the scaling of formal employment. This is indeed the case. However, the explanation becomes less compelling once we observe that the scaling of, for example, syphilis is significantly different from that of chlamydia, despite spreading on similar network architectures [11] . Similarly, the scaling of employment in administrative services is significantly different from the employment of agents and brokers. Again, two examples of employment in industries which may rely on similar job networks. We argue that thinking that the scaling exponent contains information only about the underlying network of interactions is mistaken; it also reflects the node attributes and the characteristics of the phenomenon in question as well. Instead of emphasizing that interactions scale faster than the number of individuals in a network, it is the diversity of types of interactions growing with the number of interactions which our model emphasizes. Therefore, the idea of the field r is to quantify what really matters about the context in which individuals are embedded: that some contexts are more diverse, which is to say, some contexts are more complementary to some individuals than others.
Little attention has been paid to the role of the phenomenon's inherent complexity and individuals' competence. To the best of our knowledge, the simultaneous interaction between the city, the phenomenon and the individual had not been modeled before. As a result, previous theories were incomplete. Not surprisingly, any deviations from the expected behavior was mostly attributed to peculiarities of the underlying networks, rather than to the phenomena under examination or the individuals involved.
Superficially, our claim that the drivers behind the prevalence of a phenomenon in a city are the people, the city, and the phenomenon itself may seem trivial. However, we showed that one can quantify how the phenomenon, the individual and the city each contribute to the occurrence of the urban phenomenon, and we specified the mathematical way in which they interact. Overall, we are proposing an integrated understanding of urban phenomena that improves on network-based models because we account not only for the properties of cities (i.e., the network), but also for the characteristics of the phenomenon and the attributes of individuals (i.e, the nodes in the network).
That our model has superior predictive power compared to more parsimonious alternatives suggests that the added complexity of the model is, in fact, useful in better fitting the data and is indicative of a model that is a more complete representation of reality. Furthermore, the better prediction performance of the model compared to that of different functional forms of the dependent variable suggest that, indeed, cities and socioeconomic phenomena can be characterized through a few quantities, but that these interact as a product in an exponential argument. This functional form emphasizes the importance of complementarity, because if either the individual, the place, or the phenomenon, are not conducive to the occurrence of the event in question, the event will become exponentially unlikely.
The three quantities we estimated from the model were shown to have measurable asso-ciations with other relevant quantities beyond employment. We found all three measures to correlate strongly with the average establishment size of firms, and with average wages of workers, across cities and industries. We must note, however, that one association was found to hold in contradiction to our expectations: that industry complexity is negatively associated with the size of establishments. Of course, we have not yet tested for causality, so extrapolations from these associations must be done with caution. Still, these results suggest that the estimated measures of inherent complexity of industries and collective knowhow of cities, based on first principles, may be useful for targeting opportunities for economic growth.
Our model does not yet specify how places acquire capabilities, or how capabilities emerge or evolve. This is part of future work, but one crucial insight can be drawn from our regression analyses linking our model with the larger literature on economic complexity: we found that the number of capabilities (present in cities or required by industries) are as important as the type of capabilities. This result was found by comparing the regression coefficients of ECI and PCI proposed in [1] against our "drivers" (column 7 in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively). The inclusion of the ECI and PCI is statistically orthogonal to our measures of collective knowhow and industry complexity. This finding, while inconsistent with the conventional interpretation of the ECI and PCI, provides evidence that these quantities are capturing different information about economic activities in places. Namely, our estimates measure information about the number of capabilities in places and industries, while the PCI and ECI capture the specialization patterns about which types of capabilities are present in a place, or required by an industry. Hence, the important conclusion here is that both the number and the type of capabilities affect economic performance. The generalization of the model must thus require an explicit inclusion of technological similarities between industries [67] , and presumably including migration dynamics between cities to model the flow of capabilities [68] .
Related to these findings, we note that, as shown before, changes in collective knowhow might have the largest effect on the levels of employment in an industry, while changes in the complexity of the industry might have the smallest. In general, the strength of these associations are found not to hold in the relationship of these quantities with the dependent variables. For example, while the size of establishments does seem to be strongly associated with the estimated level of collective knowhow of cities, average wages are instead strongly associated the complexity of industries. Further empirical analysis about the strength of these effects requires additional analysis and is also left for future investigation.
The model put forth in this paper advances our understanding of social and urban phenomena by shifting the focus away from deterministic models that paint cities as homogeneous systems in equilibrium determined by market forces, made of representative goods and individuals. We believe our model contributes to the literature by painting an image of the city where statistical regularities emerge from stochastic processes that result from cities being heterogeneous places, with diverse individuals engaging in an interconnected network of complex phenomena. 
Appendix A Derivation of the model
For mathematical and statistical convenience, assume the factors are "assembled" within or around individuals, but keep in mind that the "assemblers" of the elements can be households, firms, or other organizations. For example, a person can become an inventor not only if her encounter with another person is conducive to patenting, but if a large confluence of factors during her life happen in the right order in the right moment at the right place. To model these situations from the point of view of this theoretical framework we represent a given phenomenon by a list of "factors" or "ingredients", an individual by a vector of size equal to the list of ingredients flagging (e.g., identifying with 0s or 1s) which of the factors or ingredients she is already endowed with, and a city is represented by another vector (of the same size) flagging which of the factors or ingredients can be found in the city. A phenomenon occurs when the requirements for the phenomenon are all satisfied, either because the individual has them or because they are provisioned by the city. Let us assume that a specific industry f requires the combination of M f different and complementary capabilities. These may include knowhow of finance and accounting, a legal team, engineering capabilities, a team of technicians doing research and development, plus sales and marketing capabilities. Thus, we will typically think of "capabilities" as "professional or job occupations", although they can also include public services that a production process may need as a necessary requirement.
The parameter M f represents, in this view, the "inherent complexity" of the economic activity associated with the production of industry's product f . The more capabilities are needed, the larger the value of M f , and the more complex the activity. Notice we are assuming that capabilities do not substitute each other, and the number of capabilities is large, i.e., M f 1. Thinking probabilistically in this model will provide several insights, and this is enabled by the assumption about the large multiplicity of capabilities [3] . Now, let s i represent a measure of how many of the capabilities individual i already has. Specifically, let it be the probability that she has any capability of the M f capabilities required by the typical business in industry f . This probability can be interpreted as a measure of her individual knowhow. For example, if the industry in consideration is shoe manufacturing, s i represents the chances she knows any one of the capabilities in a shoe manufacturing firm. The larger the parameter s i is, the better equipped she will be in engaging in the shoe manufacturing business, and, as we will see, the less there will be a need to put together a team of people to run such a business. Notice, however, that while s i can be interpreted as the level of schooling or education, it does not capture the depth of knowledge but the breadth: It is about how many different things she could know how to do individually. The probability she will get a job in a specific industry f on her own merits is the probability she will have all capabilities, which is given by s M f i . Since s i is a number between 0 and 1, the more complex the economic activity, the probability she will be successful finding a job will decrease exponentially with M f . This probability, however, does not yet account for the fact that she lives in a city and the probability of being employed actually depends on finding a space (e.g., a place of work) that already has people with the complementary capabilities she does not have. In other words, through her exposure to other sources of capabilities from living in city c, like family, friends, colleagues or, in general, public and private services, individual i could in principle be able to get and complete missing skills and capabilities outside her expertise. Presumably, the bigger the city, the more diverse, and the larger D c will be.
Since D c are the capabilities provided by the city, a job in business f in city c requires that individual i knows M f − D c capabilities. These are capabilities that she will need to bring to the business on her own, without the help of the city. Thus, the probability that i will be employed in industry f given that she lives in a city where she has access to D c capabilities is equal to
Thus, living in a diverse city has the effect that finding a job is exponentially easier. In reality, however, D c is not a fixed number. Cities are dynamic places, they change from neighborhood to neighborhood and from day to day, and no person is exposed to the city as a whole. Hence, if individual i is very unlucky she may get D c = 0, or she can be super lucky and get D c = M f . To take this stochasticity into account, we can also think instead of the probability that the city provides any of the capabilities. Let us denote this probability by r c . The expected number of capabilities offered in the city, required to get a job in f , is E[D|city c] = r c M f . Thinking of D c probabilistically, means thinking of D c in this context as a "binomially distributed random variable" D with parameters M f and r c .
To correctly compute the probability that individual i will get a job, we thus need to average Eq. (5) over all the possible number of capabilities the city may offer:
We can generalize this model and imagine that the city has a "field" spread in the xy-coordinates, r c (x, y). This field is an abstraction of the urban milieu, it represents the probability that the city provides one of the ingredients for phenomena to occur, and we can assume that people interact with it as they live and work in the city. It should capture the elements from all the types of urban interactions to which people are exposed (both the social and built environment). In this view, the city functions as though it is permeated across space by a "cultural field", and r c (x, y) quantifies the magnitude of the social, economic, and cultural repertoire available at a particular location. When the value of the field is high, it means that this location in the city has a high concentration of "diverse urban factors". A high value of r c (x, y) will therefore increase the probability that an individual will find the right elements to engage in a given urban phenomenon (e.g., to be employable in an industry). Eq. (6) assumes individuals interact with the average intensity of the field, r c ≡ r c (x, y) , where · is a spatial average. The mean field approach allows us to isolate a core mechanism in the model: that urban phenomena occur because individuals are able to "execute" a recipe (e.g., a production process, a program or algorithm) if the environment is favorable, that is, if the city complements the individual. How complex a given recipe is, how capable is an individual, and how suitable is the city for executing the recipe are the three fundamental quantities that determine the overall statistics of employment in cities, as well as other measures of urban output.
Equation (6) implies an exponential function. With some minor rearrangement, the probability that X i,c,f = 1 can be written as
The exponent is the product of three quantities, respectively associated with the phenomenon, the person, and the city. These are the drivers of employment in the city, which is why we refer to them as the drivers of urban economic complexity. We will flesh out the meaning of each of these terms below, but we want to emphasize that the value of such equation is that, through it, the model establishes null expectations regarding the broad patterns manifested across urban phenomena. Such approach is typical in "mean field theories" in physics. Let us contrast this result with other models.
Appendix B Impact of the drivers on economic performance
Small changes in any of the three terms can in principle have very large effects on the employability of a person. If we denote p i,c,f the probability in Eq. (1), the change in each term has the following meaning:
• Technological improvement of production process of f :
• Individual learning for individual i:
• Collective learning for city c:
The partial derivatives have the term M f because we want them to reflect changes in the number of capabilities, not changes in the parameters themselves. Using the same units of change allows us to compare these rates. Hence, ∂(−M f ) ≡ −∂M f represents the reduction of the number of capabilities required by industry f , ∂(M f s i ) ≡ M f ∂s i represents the increase in the average number of capabilities known by the individual i, and
represents the increase in the average number of capabilities present in city c. 4 In this way, the probability that individual i will be employable, Pr{X i,c,f = 1}, will increase according to Eq. (8) through technology improvements, Eq. (9) tells us that it will increase through individual learning, and Eq. (10) that it will increase through collective learning.
Since the city is seen here as a large set of capabilities, the probability it provides any input is much larger than the probability an individual has it, so r c s i . Conversely, 1−r c 1−s i . Consequently, we have that 0
The implication is that these rates have the following order:
Thus, the effect on the probability of employment of a technology improvement is smaller than the effect of individual learning which is smaller than the effect of collective learning.
Increasing the collective knowhow of city c can occur through immigration that brings capabilities and knowhow in people not available already in c 5 , direct foreign investments that inject specific capabilities to specific industries, or by pure innovation. These have a significant effect on the probability that i will be employed in f according to Eq. (11). Figure 6 illustrates these effects separately.
Presently, we lack a detailed theory about the dynamical laws of these drivers and how they relate to one another. Still, the comparisons in Eq. (11) allow us to remark that increases in collective knowhow may have a reinforcing effect which initiates a virtuous cycle: a place with a relative large body of collective knowhow will attract more people and facilitate more complex economic activities, which themselves will increase the body of collective knowhow in that place. This process will thus propel a run-away cycle of collective learning that will concentrate economic activities and wealth in large cities (see, e.g., [29] ). The more complex the activities, the more concentrated they will be in very few places. Once again, this explains why complex activities (e.g., being an inventor) tend to happen and concentrate disproportionately more in large cities as compared to less complex activities [3] .
The comparison in Eq. (11) hinges on highly simplifying assumptions. For example, the comparison assumes that a linear (infinitesimal) change in the three variables is comparable among them. In other words, it does not take into account the cost of these changes. Furthermore, the model does not take into account externalities, like the effect that a Fig 6. Comparing the three ways of increasing the probability that individual i in city c is employed in industry f . For each panel, one of the parameters is explicitly shown to vary across the x-axis, another parameter is changed in order to represent the change in probability (either by a technological improvement in the left panels, individual learning in the middle panels, and collective learning in the right columns), and another parameter is implicitly kept constant, correspondingly at values M f = 8, s i = 0.2, or r c = 0.8. In each panel, the change from lightblue to darkblue lines represents the increase in probability due to a change in M f (left panels), s i (middle panels), and r c , equivalent to one capability. Hence, a technological improvement is when M f is reduced by 1, individual learning is when s i is increased by 1/M f , and collective learning is when r c is increased by 1/M f . technological change in industry f has on an industry f . Nevertheless, with these comparisons one can hypothesize which of the three drivers has the largest impact on economic performance.
Appendix C Data sources
Data was downloaded using the programming codes that have made available by the Bureau of Labor Statistics through the website http://www.bls.gov/cew/doc/access/data_ access_examples.htm. We use data on the estimated counts of employment, number of establishments and average wages by city-industry-year. The reader should be aware that 'establishments' and 'firms' do not refer to the same thing. Establishments are typically synonymous to 'plants', and firms can be multi-establishment: "An establishment is a single physical location where one predominant activity occurs. A firm is an establishment or a combination of establishments" (from https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article/ establishment-firm-or-enterprise.htm).
The specific data for cities are the definition of metropolitan statistical areas which was selected using the guide in http://www.bls.gov/cew/doc/titles/area/area_titles.htm. We will use the terms metropolitan areas and cities interchangeably. The metropolitan codes are from the 2004 definitions, but we drop the metropolitan areas located in Puerto Rico. The list of industry codes can be found in http://www.bls.gov/cew/doc/titles/industry/ industry_titles.htm. We use employment numbers aggregated to 3-digit level industries.
The original industry 3-digit classification has 91 different industries. However, we cannot blindly apply our theory to all industries. Our theory applies to phenomena that can be regarded as the output of urban processes. This constrains the phenomena and the type of activities that we can analyze. In the case of industries, our model does not apply to those for which firms are constrained by the local demand for their product or service (e.g., "Scenic and sightseeing transportation"), or to those that are natural-resource-based (e.g., "Oil and gas extraction"). In other words, our model applies to the firms whose existence depends instead on whether there is availability of the required capabilities for their processes, and are firms that can in principle sell their products outside the city (i.e., demand can be assumed to be infinite). Hence, we kept in our analysis 78 industries that were likely to be less constrained by local demand for their products or services and more likely to be constrained by their production requirements (e.g., availability of high-skilled workers), and we discarded the other 23. See Table 3 for the list of excluded industries, and Table 4 for those we included.
To construct the measures of occupational diversity for industries, we use the yearly tables, from 2003 to 2016, that are published in May (e.g., https://www.bls.gov/oes/special. requests/oesm16in4.zip).
Data on Gross Metropolitan Product and Population can be downloaded from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Appendix D Estimating individual knowhow
Assuming s i across individuals in city c are statistically distributed according to probability p S (S = s i |c), we want to compute the expected mean of Pr{X i,c,f = 1} across individuals in c. Assuming the values of s i do not differ significantly from an averages c (i.e., S approximates a degenerate random variable), we can use Jensen's inequality such that the arithmetic mean can be approximated by the geometric mean. Hence,
in which we obtain the same functional form as before, but instead of s i we have the average individual knowhow in city c,s c ≈ i∈c s i /N c . In the construction of the model, we emphasized that the quantity s i captures the competency of individual i to be endowed with any given capability. In the context of the model, a large value of s i means that individual i will be able to know how to do many different things. We do not have a direct way of estimating this quantity.
Given the regression model we propose, we only have γ c , which is an estimate of − ln((1 − s c )(1 − r c )). In order to separate γ c into the individual-level and city-level quantities, we will assume that s i is positively correlated with educational attainment. More years of educational attainment are usually a measure of specialization. But they are also an indication of a person's competency, and thus we will proxys c using the average levels of schooling in the city c.
The American Community Survey (ACS) provides data on Educational Attainment through the website https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/ productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_16_5YR_S1501&prodType=table. We use the data corresponding to the 5-year averages from 2009 to 2016. For the "Population 25 years and over", we collect the population numbers for the seven different levels of educational attainment available: Less than 9th grade, 9th to 12th grade (no diploma), high school graduate, some college (no degree), associate's degree, bachelor's degree, and graduate or professional degree. We use an ordinal variable for each level, from 1 to 7, and we average them weighting by the number of people counted with that educational level:
where P c is the size of the population 25 years or older in city c, and P c (l) is the portion whose maximum level of education is level l. By construction, l P c (l) = P c .
Appendix E Alternative models
Note that the model in Equation (3) has a free parameter for each industry and one for each city, hence it is more complex (in terms of degrees of freedom) than alternative models that may consist of fewer parameters. Since our model has so many degrees of freedom, it can accommodate and fit well data. Therefore, it is not wise to falsify the theory based on the data we used to fit the model. Our model, in other words, has the risk of overfitting the data. The hypothesis to test is whether our model has a superior capacity to predict values of y c,f which were not used in the model-fitting procedure ("out-of-sample prediction"), as compared to other alternative models. If our model is indeed comparatively better, then we will have evidence that the theory is capturing meaningful aspects of reality that other models are not [31] . Hence, we propose to evaluate the predictive power of model (3) with respect to the following alternative models using holdout data. These alternative models require less, or the same, number of parameters: Model 1.1:
ln (y c,f,t ) = δ f,t + γ c,t + ε c,f,t .
Model 2.1: ln (y c,f,t ) = α f,t + 0.16 ln (N c,t ) + ε c,f,t .
Model 2.2:
ln (y c,f,t ) = α f,t + β f,t ln (N c,t ) + ε c,f,t .
Note we have divided models in two types: fixed-effects models that differ among themselves in the functional transformation of the dependent variable 6 , and urban scaling models that use population size as the independent variable. In other words, models 1.1 and 1.2 change the left-hand side of the regression equation while models 2.1 and 2.2 change the right-hand side. The subscript t to denote the year will be dropped for simplification in what follows, unless needed explicitly. Model 1.1 assumes the per capita rates of employment are driven by two additive terms, one from the industry and the other for the city. Model 1.2 assumes, instead, that the per capita rate is the product of the industry and city fixed-effects, and thus by taking logarithms we separate such interaction. Notice that in models 1.1 and 1.2, as in our model (3), we exclude the intercept. Differences in performance between model (3) and models 1.1 and 1.2 will inform us about the importance of the specific functional form predicted by the theory.
Model 2.1 is the standard urban scaling model where it is assumed that the scaling exponent is the same for all phenomena, as suggested by network-based explanations. We will use population as the measure of city size. Results of our analysis, however, are qualitatively the same if one uses alternative measures like total employment. Model 2.2 is an unconstrained version of Model 2.1, where we assume that both the baseline prevalence and the scaling exponent differ, in principle, for each industry f . Differences in performance between model (3) and models 2.1 and 2.2 will inform us about the validity of adding degrees of freedom to explain employment patterns across cities and industries.
For each year, we will split the data into training and testing sets. These sets are defined as lists of randomly chosen pairs (c, f ) of cities and phenomena. Some of these pairs will either belong to R (the train set) while others to S (the test set). After the parameters of the models are fitted using the training data, they are then compared by how accurately they predict the dependent variable on the test set. 6 We thank F. Neffke for suggesting these alternatives. 7 Another approach to compare models would be to fit the models on all the data available and then use some goodness-of-fit statistic penalizing by the complexity of each model, like the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and then choosing that model which performs best (e.g., the model with the lowest AIC value). This approach is in general asymptotically equivalent to the presented above (see, e.g., [69, 70] ). The "train-then-test" approach was chosen for two reasons. First, the quantity of data is large enough that it allows to have large sizes for both train and test sets for doing cross-validation. This frees us from the underlying assumptions behind metrics like AIC or BIC. Second, The predictions will be evaluated using the root mean squared error,
and the mean absolute error,
where y c,f is the predicted value. Both metrics quantify the predictive accuracy of models, but RM SE is more sensitive to outliers, while M AE quantifies the average prediction errors weighting all deviations equally. M AE is thus preferable over RM SE, although we show both for completeness. The train and test random splits will be repeated 100 different times of the data (bootstrapping cross-validation).
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Appendix F Canonical scaling with population density
In the main text, we said that canonical network-based and density-based models of urban scaling have the limitation that they predict a unique way in which all phenomena will scale with population density. To see this, assume that a measure of output per capita (e.g., GDP per-capita) is proportional to the number of interactions y ∝ I between between a person and the rest of people in the city (or a fraction), as in [32] . The fraction of interactions, in turn, is proportional to the density of social interactions, I ∝ N/A social , because A social is the area in which social interactions occur (e.g., the infrastructural network). Assuming individuals are uniformly spread in an physical area A spatial , then the average distance between individuals is d, and we get that the area is proportional to A spatial ∝ N d 2 . Assuming social interactions in space span the "social area" defined by the tree of close proximity interactions (see [72, 73] ), one obtains that A social ∝ N d, which implies that A social ∝ (N A spatial ) 1/2 . If ρ = N/A spatial is the spatial population density, then we get that
According to this reasoning, output per-capita scales with the square root of city population density. From this, Bettencourt (2013) [32] derives a direct association of output per capita with population size alone by proposing some constraints on the minimum budget and cost of and more importantly, out-of-sample prediction is a fair and assumptions-free method to compare different models (see [71] for further discussion). 8 Notice this exercise is different from a typical predictive exercise using machine learning techniques, which may split the data in three (or more): a training set used to fit models, a validation set used to optimize models and select any free "hyper-parameters" they may depend on, and a test set that is used only once to report and compare final performance across models. Our models do not have hyper-parameters and, as a consequence, we only need two-way splits of the data.
traversing the city, which implies an association between the surface area of the city and population size. Hence, given the constraints, he gets that A spatial ∝ N D/(D+H) , where D is the dimensionality of the city (in principle, D = 2) and H is the fractal dimension of the path that people use to traverse the city. One could argue that different scaling exponents across phenomena are explained by the existence of different values of H which apply to different economic activities or industries. However, we emphasize that differences in H would still not change the association between output and population density, which is why we claim that network/density-based explanations predict a fix scaling with density, regardless of any consideration about spatial equilibrium and budget constraints.
Appendix G List of industries excluded and included in analysis Table 3 . Industries excluded from analysis due to the fact that their appearance in cities is determined by government or mainly driven by availability of demand as opposed to availability of capacities for supply. 
Appendix H The effects of changing the dependent variable
We show in the main text that when comparing models that regress different forms of the dependent variable on city-and phenomenon-fixed effects, our model performs best. But what is the effect of alternating between the functions y, ln(y), and − ln(− ln(y))? Figure 7 shows that taking the logarithm of the per capita rates a single time amplifies the differences between the smallest values. Interestingly, taking the logarithm twice seems to amplify both small and large values, but to a less degree. Figure 8 shows the histograms of the per capita values in our data, according to the three transformations. This effect is what explains why the second best model is not to regress the logarithm of per capita rates on the fixed effects, but to regress directly the per capita values without taking logarithms. 19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 Tables 1 and 2) , and plot the point estimate of the coefficients of such regressions with their corresponding standard error bars.
Appendix K Time series of partial elasticities for population size, complexity and collective knowhow Figures 13 and 14 show the coefficients of the regressions measuring economic performance (firm size and wages) for different years.
